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SERRANO v. PRIEST AND ITS IMPACT
ON NEW MEXICO
On August 30, 1971, the Supreme Court of California, one judge
dissenting, held that the California system of financing public schools
violated the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
of the United States Constitution. This case, Serrano v. Priest,'
although binding only on California, may have consequences more
widespread than those of Brown v. Board of Education2 which
struck down school segregation in 1953.
Robert Scott, Governor of North Carolina and Chairman of the
Education Commission of the States, summarized the potential consequences of the decision as follows:
To some it may pave a way to much needed property tax relief;
others may contemplate greater involvement by state leaders in local
educational affairs; some will anticipate expanded sales and income
taxes; hopefully many will see the opportunity to improve the
quality of education for thousands of children who reside in communities with poor tax resources; others will begin to consider more
seriously alternative
programs that tend toward fuller state funding
3
for schools.
Since the Serrano decision, there has been much speculation and
confusion as to what its impact will be in other states. This article is
an attempt to review the background of the case, examine its holding
and analyze its potential impact on New Mexico.
SERRANO: BACKGROUND
The current assault on school financing systems began in 1967
when the legal theories applied in Serrano were developed by John
Coons, now professor of law at the University of California, Berkeley, who was then consultant to the Chicago Superintendent of
Schools. In the summer of 1967 the theories were used by the city of
Detroit which had funding problems similar to those of Chicago.'
Detroit brought suit against the state of Michigan in 1968 claiming
that its schools were underfinanced in violation of the equal protec1. Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal.3d 584, 487 P.2d 1241, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601 (1971).
2. Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1953).
3. Legislative Review, Sept. 3, 1971, at 1 (Publication of the Educational Commission of
the States).
4. Address by Stephen D. Sugarman to the Regional Interstate Project, Denver, Oct. 8,
1971.
5. The Board of Education of the School District of the City of Detroit, et al. v. The
State of Michigan and Allison Green, its Treasurer, (County Ct. Wayne City, Michigan,
complaint filed Feb. 2, 1968). The case file is available through the Clerk of the Court of
Wayne Co., 201 Court Unit, City-County Building, Detroit, Michigan 48226.
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tion clause of the U.S. Constitution.6 Although the court rejected
Detroit's contention,' similar suits were immediately fled in California, Illinois and Texas assailing disparities in funding plans for public
education. 8
Mclnnis v. Shapiro,9 the Illinois case, was a challenge to that
state's public school funding system which in essence involved heavy
reliance on local property taxes, a state-funded flat grant to school
districts and state equalization funds. This was attacked as violating
the due process and the equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
The plaintiffs argued that statutes which authorize large disparities
in school funding are irrational and hence violate the due process
clause.1" The court found, however, that the state legislature's
choice of a funding plan was rational. It gave local governments some
choice as to what their tax rate would be and also permitted them to
decide how much they valued various municipal services. The court
further stated:
Certainly, parents who cherish education are constitutionally
allowed to spend more money on their children's schools, be it by
private instruction or higher tax rates, than those who do not value
education so highly. 1 1
This argument suffers from the fault that rich districts are the only
ones that can choose a tax effort for support of education since, in
many instances, poorer districts are taxing at a maximum rate just to
keep their doors open.
The Illinois court's conclusion on the equal protection argument
was that:
There is no constitutional requirement that the public school expenditures be made only on the basis of pupils' educational needs
without regard to the financial strength of local school districts. Nor
does the Constitution establish the rigid guideline of equal dollar
expenditures for each student. 2

It had earlier stated that school funding problems were better resolved by legislatures than in the courts.' 3
6. Supra note 4.
7. Id.
8. News from the National Urban Coalition, Aug. 31, 1971, at 2 (Newsletter of the
National Urban Coalition).
9. Mclnnis v. Shapiro, 293 F. Supp. 327 (N.D. Ill. 1968), affd mem. sub nom. Mclnnis v.
Ogilvie, 394 U.S. 322 (1969).
10. Id. at 331.

11. Id at 331, n. 11.
12. Id. at 336.

13. Id. at 332.
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In addition to holding that the Fourteenth Amendment does not
require school funding based only on the child's educational needs,
the court struck down plaintiff's contentions because ".... there are
no 'discoverable and manageable standards' by which a court can
determine when the Constitution is satisfied and when it is
violated." 1 4
Civil Rights cases, as well as cases dealing directly with school
funding schemes, have had a bearing on Serrano. In Brown v. Board
of Education the importance of education was emphasized as follows:
[E] ducation is perhaps the most important function of state and
local governments ....In these days, it is doubtful that any child
may reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he is denied the
opportunity of an education. Such an opportunity, where the state
has undertaken to provide it, is a right which must be made available
to all on equal terms.' 5
Discrimination by wealth was declared unconstitutional in the
voting rights cases,"6 and in Baker v. Carr"' the court came to the
aid of under-represented electoral districts. People in these electoral
districts were in a predicament analogous to school children living in
poor school districts.' 8 They could not force legislative change and
hence had to turn to the courts to stop discrimination against them.
Courts have not been alone in confronting school financing problems. On July 1, 1971, the Education Commission of the States
addressed this subject and adopted the following resolution:
Be it resolved that it is the position of the Education Commission of
the States that states adopt a system of financial aid to local districts
which in fact equalizes educational opportunities and reduces
reliance upon property taxes for the support of education.' 9
SERRANO: ITS HOLDING
The holding of the California Supreme Court in Serrano is as
follows:
We, therefore, arrive at these conclusions. The California public
school financing system, as presented to us by plaintiffs' complaint
14. Id.at 335 (footnotes omitted).
15. 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1953).
16. E.g., Harper v. Virginia State Board of Education, 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
17. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
18. Brief for Stephen D. Sugarman, John E. Coons, The Urban Coalition, and The
National Committee for the Support of the Public Schools as Amicus Curiac at 26, Serrano
v. Priest (L.A. No. 29, 820) (hereinafter cited as Urban Coalition Brief).
19. Supra note 3, at 2.
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supplemented by matters judicially noticed, since it deals intimately
with education, obviously touches upon a fundamental interest. For
the reasons we have explained in detail, this system conditions the
full entitlement to such interest on wealth, classifies its recipients on
the basis of their collective affluence and makes the quality of a
child's education depend upon the resources of his school district
and ultimately upon the pocketbook of his parents. We find that
such financing system as presently constituted is not necessary to
the attainment of any compelling state interest. Since it does not
withstand the requisite "strict scrutiny," it denies to the plaintiffs
and other similarly situated the equal protection of the laws. 2 0

Stated more concisely, the Serrano principle is: "The quality of
public education may not be a function of wealth other than the
wealth of the State as a whole.'
In reaching this decision, the court had to decide a number of
important preliminary questions.
A.

De Facto v. De Jure Discrimination
The defendants in Serrano argued that the discrimination involved

was de facto (in fact) and not de jure (of law). They relied on school
segregation cases and argued that since the United States Supreme
Court had not found de facto school segregation unconstitutional, de
facto wealth discrimination was not unconstitutional.
The California court struck down this argument ".... for want of a

solid foundation in law and logic."' 2 2 It noted the present system
involved state sanctioned discrimination resulting in discrepancies in
available revenues for school purposes. The court further found the
state had consciously set up districts of unequal wealth and had
permitted these to tax at different rates, for its patterns of discrinination ".. . are shaped and hardened by zoning ordinances and

other governmental land use controls which promote economic exclusivity." 2 3
Note was then taken of the following dicta in Hobson v. Hansen:
Orthodox equal protection doctrine can be encapsulated in a single
rule: government action which without justification imposes unequal
burdens or awards unequal benefits is unconstitutional .... Whatever
the law was once, it is a testament to our maturing concept of
equality that, with the help of Supreme Court decisions in the last
decade, we now firmly recognize that the arbitrary quality of
20.
21.
22.
23.

5 CaL3d at 615, 487 P.2d at 1263, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 623 (1971) (footnotes omitted).
Urban Coalition Brief, supra note 18, at 4.
5 CaL3d at 602, 487 P.2d at 1253, 96 CaL Rptr. at 613 (1971).
5 CaL3d at 603, 487 P.2d at 1254, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 614 (1971).
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thoughtlessness can be as disastrous and unfair to private rights and
the public interest as the perversity of a willful scheme. 2 4
The California court expressly refused to ".

.

. attach an over-

simplified label to the complex configuration of public and private
decisions which has resulted in the present allocation of educational
funds.",2 1 It did, however, reject defendant's contention that this
was merely de facto discrimination and hence constitutional.
B.

Education: A FundamentalInterest
Stephen D. Sugarman, an attorney who argued amici curiae to the
California Supreme Court in Serrano for the Urban Coalition, says
this about the decision:
In this case .... the fundamental thing that the court said that was

new, that was dramatic, was that education is a fundamental

interest, like voting, like free speech, like the right to travel ....It's

not a mere economic and social thing ....It involves a discrimination against the poor and therefore.., is bad unless the state
can show there is a compelling interest for that system. 2 6
The Urban Coalition brief contended that education "... lies at

the core of both speech and association; it is indispensable to any
functional view of civic and political life; it is a major determinant of
each child's future." It went on to say: "It would be hard to believe
that the Court has such special concern for speech, political action,
and the future of children without an equivalent concern for the
intellectual preconditions of their fulfillment." '2 1
The court adopted this position. In recognizing the fundamental
importance of education, the court emphasized that the state has
recognized its importance by making it compulsory and assigning
students to specific school districts. 2
Once the court found education was a fundamental right under
the Constitution, the burden fell on the state to show that the
present discriminatory system, if it was to be upheld as constitutional, was justified by a compelling state interest.
The state argued the system provided for local control of schools.
The court dismissed this argument stating: "No matter how the state
decides to finance its system of public education, it can still leave
this decision-making power in the hands of local districts." ' 29
24. Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401 (D.C. 1967) cited in 5 Cal.3d at 603, 487 P.2d
at 1254, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 614, n. 18 (1971).
25. 5 CaL3d at 603, 487 P.2d at 1255, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 615, n. 20 (1971).
26. Supra note 4.
27. Urban Coalition Brief, supra note 18, at 30.

28. 5 Cal.3d at 610, 487 P.2d at 1259, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 619 (1971).
29. 5 CaL3d at 611, 487 P.2d at 1260, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 620 (1971).
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The state then argued that the present system permitted local
districts to determine how much they wanted to spend for public
education. The court found ".... such fiscal freewill is a cruel illusion
for the poor school districts," 3 and rejected the idea that this constituted a compelling state interest.
Essentially, the court found that if equal educational opportunity
is not made available to all, an aristocracy, not a meritocracy, will
result, for the poor won't have a chance to reach their potential
through education. 3
C. Does Mclnnis Control?
Although Mclnnis involved a similar fact situation, the California
court found it not controlling in Serrano.
First there is a procedural argument. The United States Supreme
Court has two types of jurisdiction: mandatory and permissive. In
Mclnnis the jurisdiction was mandatory because the case
"... reached the Supreme Court by way of appeal from a three-judge
federal court.. .3 2 Although Mclnnis got a summary affirmance
from the Supreme Court, the ".. . decision could be considered to-be
simply an unwillingness to take the case and not a decision on the
merits." 3"
When the Supreme- Court refuses to hear a case where it has mandatory jurisdiction, as in Mclnnis, this in fact results in affirming the
lower court. The court's summary affirmance here amounts to the
same thing.3 4 Although this is technically an adjudication on the
amounts to "the substantial equivalent of a
merits, in practice it
35
denial of certiorari."
The Serrano opinion notes:
Frankfurter and Landis had suggested earlier that the pressure of the
court's docket and differences of opinion among the judges operate
"to subject the obligatory jurisdiction of the court to discretionary
considerations not unlike those governing certiorari." [Frankfurter
& Landis, The Business of the Supreme Court at October Term,
1929, 44 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 14 (1930).] Between 60 and 84 percent of
appeals in recent years have been summarily handled by the
Court without opinion. (Stern & Gressman, supra, at
Supreme
3
194) 6

30. 5 CaL.3d at 611,487 P.2d at 1260, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 620 (1971).
31. Supra note 4.
32. 5 Cal.3d at 616, 487 P.2d at 1264, 96 CaL. Rptr. at 624 (1971).
33. Supra note 4.
34. Id.
35. D. Currie, The Three-Judge District Court in Constitutional Litigation, 2 U. Chi. L.
Rev. 1, 74, n. 365 (1964) cited in 5 CaL3d at 616, 487 P.2d at 1264, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 624.
36. 5 Cal. 3d at 616, 487 P.2d at 1264, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 624 (1971) (footnotes omitted).

NEW MEXICO LAW RE VIEW

[Vol. 2

It further notes that "[s]ummary disposition of a case by the
Supreme Court need not prevent the court from later holding a full
hearing on the same issue.
Even if Mclnnis is a decision on the merits, Serrano raises a different theory. The issue in Mclnnis was whether or not there is a
constitutional right to spending for education according to the needs
of children. The "educational needs" aspect of Mclnnis raised a
judicially unmanageable standard and the argument for spending
equal dollars on each child was found not to be a constitutional
right. Serrano, on the other hand, challenges discrimination based on
wealth.
D. Misconceptions About the Serrano Decision
The Serrano decision has been widely misunderstood and misinterpreted. Education U.S.A., the National School Public Relations
Association's weekly newsletter stated that in Serrano "....

the court

said equal spending for students is a basic right." 3 This is incorrect.
The case only requires that community wealth not be the basis of
discriminatory school funding systems. Under Serrano discrepancies
in school spending are permissible as long as reasonable educational
criteria justify the disparity. 3 9
- Professor John E. Coons, one of the leading experts on this subject, emphasizes that:
[T] he Court's action did not:
REQUIRE UNIFORM spending statewide for public education.
SAY AN EQUAL amount of money must be spent for each
student.
SAY EACH DISTRICT must have the same quality of educational program.
BAR ASSESSED VALUATION as an educational tax base.
STOP THE STATE from spending
40 extra money for special educational needs or programs.
It is argued that the Serrano principle will apply to other local
governmental services like police and fire protection. 4 ' Mr. Sugarman refers to this argument as the "equal sewer question." The problem with the argument is that this principle could only be extended
to encompass fundamental interests under the Constitution.
Although policemen, fire protection and sewers are of great impor37.
38.
1971).
39.
40.
41.

5 Cal.3d at 616, 487 P.2d at 1264, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 624, n. 35 (1971).
1971 Education U.S.A., at 7 (Nat'l School Pub. Relations Ass'n, D.C., Sept. 13,
Urban Coalition Brief, supra note 18, at 37-38.
Sacramento Report, Sept. 15, 1971 (Cal. School Boards Ass'n. publication).
Wall Street Journal, Sept. 6, 1971, at 12, col. 1.
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tance in our society, it is doubtful that they -are fundamental
interests guaranteed by the United States Constitution.4 2
Some allege Serrano will bring about the end of local control of
school districts.
The Urban Coalition brief says this about local choice in California's school districts:
Far from being an embodiment of local choice, it is in fact its

antithesis. The primary effect of the structure is not the sharing of
State power among subordinate geographical units; rather it is the
creation of enclaves of widely variant power-some freakishly
privileged, others grossly disadvantaged. 43
In fact, local interests in school funds may be better served
.. by permitting local effort, but not local wealth, to determine

spending."' 4 4 Local control of schools is not expressly limited by
Serrano. Some state controls, however, may result from state
attempts to equalize educational opportunity through rational expenditure plans.
Serrano is a negative and absolute decision. It does not prescribe
what must be done. The problem is left for the states to resolve for
they are better equipped to deal with circumstances peculiar to their
individual funding systems. Some states discriminate less than others
but this will not excuse them from the effects of the Serrano decision. Either a state discriminates on the basis of local wealth or it
does not. If it does, Serrano declares that practice unconstitutional.
SERRANO: WHATHAPPENS NOW?
The California Supreme Court remanded Serrano to the trial court
for further proceedings at that level. This means it will be some time
before there is a final decision in the case and the United States
Supreme Court will probably not consider it until there is a final
decision.
This posed little obstacle to the future of the Serrano principle. In
January 1972, The Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights reported
that as many as 34 suits raising the Serrano question had been filed
in perhaps 20 states.4" By early March, Minnesota, Texas, New
Jersey, Arizona and Wyoming had joined California in adopting the
Serrano principle.4 6
42.
43.
44.
45.
Under
46.

Supra note 4.
Urban Coalition Brief, supra note 18, at 21.
Id. at 3.
Committee Report, Rep. #7, Jan. 1972 (The Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights
Law, Washington, D.C.).
Wall Street Journal, Mar. 13, 1972, at 1, col. 6.
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The Texas case is Rodriguez v. San Antonio Independent School
District and is now on appeal to the United States Supreme Court. It
is expected to be heard during the 1972 fall term. 4'
With the recent changes in the court's membership, one can only
speculate as to what result the United States Supreme Court will
reach when this case comes before it.
THE CALIFORNIA SYSTEM VERSUS THE NEW MEXICO SYSTEM
California and New Mexico have the responsibility of providing
public education within their respective jurisdictions. Both rely to
varying degrees on the property tax to finance education and have
developed financing systems that have resulted in "an increasingly
skewed system of financing... one in which costs for a major function of widespread benefit are largely localized."' '
As these systems are examined, it is important to remember that
although increased funding does not necessarily mean better educational opportunity, there is a positive correlation between the
amount of money spent in a school district and the quality of the
educational program which the local district can provide.
A. CaliforniaSystem
The California system is basically as follows:
1. a flat grant to each school district of $125 per pupil;
2. equalization funds (the amount received depends on the local tax
rate); and
3. local funding above the equalization figure. 4 9
Under this system the state guarantees to each school district a
certain amount of money per child-an amount, however, considerably below the average per pupil expenditure. In California, the
state provides about 36 percent of the funds for education
(elementary and secondary) and about 55 percent is raised locally.' 0
B. New Mexico System
First, a historical note and some background information on the
property tax and its role in relation to school funding is in order.
In the 1930's the legislature decided that the property tax was not
the best method for achieving adequate school financing. First, ad
valorem taxes did not generate enough revenue to meet the state's
47. Id.
48. Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations State and Local Finances and
Suggested Legislation, 318 (1971).
49. Urban Coalition Brief, supra note 18, at 6.

50. Id. at 9.
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teacher payroll. Secondly, the revenue came in in April, May and
December and forced some teachers to accept as payment warrants
that could not be exchanged for checks until the county treasurer
received property tax revenues. These warrants were purchased from
teachers at a discount by private individuals and this system resulted
in teachers receiving reduced payments for their services.
The property tax has been greatly abused since that time.
Although Art. VIII, Sec. 2, of the New Mexico Constitution provides
a 20 mill limit on the ad valorem tax, at the present time the state
assesses in excess of this amount. Attorney General Opinion 70-34
deals with this subject:
Section 72-4-11, N.M.S.A. 1953 Compilation, enacted in 1921, sets
the maximum rates of taxation for state, county, municipal and
school district purposes .... [T] he total authorized levies for
5 purposes within the twenty mill limitation adds up to 33.50 mills. 2
New Mexico derives less revenue from ad valorem taxes than most
states. In the 1969-1970 fiscal year, New Mexico state and local
governments raised $81.18 per capita with the property tax compared to a national average for that year of $167.59. This is $28.65
per $1,000 of personal income in New Mexico compared to S45.74
nationally." 3
During the calendar year 1970 the state of New Mexico collected
$13,172,000 from the property tax and local government units collected $62,848,000 for a total of $76,020,000. s ' It is unlikely that
the revenue derived from this tax will increase in the foreseeable
future because of the constitutional limitation and the improbability
that the veterans exemption will be repealed.
As New Mexico attempts to raise additional funds, there may not
be public support for increasing the property tax. A study reported
in the August 1971 issue of Nation's Cities5 5 indicated the following
about tax preferences in Albuquerque:
HOW WOULD CITIZENS PREFER TO RAISE MORE TAX MONEY?
tax on
property
Albuquerque

9%

tax on
income
20%

tax on
utilities

sales
tax

tax on car
owners

13%

41%

9%

51. Presentation at The University of New Mexico School of Law by Harry Wugalter,
Chief of Public School Finance, Oct. 5, 1971.
52. Op. Att'y Gen. 70-34 (Apr. 1, 1970).
53. Presentation at The University of New Mexico School of Law by Franklin Jones,
Commissioner of Revenue, State of New Mexico, Nov. 16, 1971.
54. Ratios of Tax Payments to Income, by Income Class, 1970, prepared by the Public
Finance Research Program, The University of New Mexico, Apr. 1971, in Jones' presentation, supra note 53.
55. Nation's Cities, Aug. 1971.
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As we turn our attention to the problems this tax creates for
school financing in New Mexico, it should be remembered that it has
long been suspect as a revenue source and cannot be expected to
provide substantially more funds in the future.
Local school districts may levy 2.225 mills to support local
schools and 4.450 mills if they also collect the assessment for a
municipality. The amount of money collected and distributed is
determined by the wealth of the local school district. New Mexico
counties may assess 6.7 mills on the assessed valuation of the property in the county. The county funds are distributed among the
districts in the county according to the average number of students
in each district based on 40-day ADM (average daily membership).
New Mexico has a uniform assessment ratio 6 and a uniform tax
levy."' Only two districts tax at rates lower than the maximum
allowable: Tatum, because of oil deposits in the district, taxes at
3.450 mills instead of 4.450, and Jemez Mountain, due to natural gas
deposits, assesses only 2.850 mills instead of 4.450." s
The purpose of the county assessment is to make the wealth of the
county available to the children of the county.' I California has a
special area-wide foundation program similar to the New Mexico
system." 0 All the Serrano decision requires is that the principle
applied on a county-wide basis in New Mexico under the present
formula be extended to the state as a whole.
New Mexico is similar to California in that it makes a basic grant
of funds to all school districts and then supplies funds through an
equalization distribution which is designed to provide a minimum
level of funding for each school child.
Although there are differences in the systems used by these states,
these differences are not important for the purposes of this article.
Under both systems, all school districts receive some state funds in a
basic grant. Those districts that raise more than 100 percent of need
are entitled to some funds as are those districts that raise very little
of their own costs. In New Mexico this results in Tatum and Mora
both getting state funds.
Both states spend more money on basic support than on equalization.6' The division of public school finance of the New Mexico
department of finance and administration estimated that in 1970-71
56. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 72-6-12.1 (Repl. 1970).
57. N.M. Const. art. 8, § 1.
58. Interview with Jessie Rodgers, Administrative Assistant to the Chief of Public School

Finance, Nov. 9, 1971.
59. Supra note 51.

60. 5 CaL3d at 593, 487 P.2d at 1247, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 607, n. 8 (1971).

61. See Urban Coalition Brief, supra note 18, at 8.
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$116,191,886 would be disbursed as basic support and $3,707,301
for equalization. 6 2
New Mexico is in a better position than California in certain
respects. First, New Mexico does not rely on the property tax as
heavily as does California. In California 36 percent of the funds for
public education come from the state while in New Mexico 77 percent of the funds are state money. 6 3 Secondly, California discriminates against the areas with lowest population, 6 ' but in New
Mexico the opposite seems to be the case. See Table II.
In other respects, New Mexico is more likely to violate the Serrano
principle than California. The uniform property tax assessment for
school purposes is pointed to as an area in which New Mexico differs
from and is in a better position than California. 6 1 It is true that the
Supreme Court of California found the graduated tax rate violated
the equal protection clause of the Federal Constitution because it
enabled wealthier school districts to get higher quality education
with a lower tax effort. The problem with this reasoning is that
although New Mexico claims it has a uniform property tax assessment for schools, it does not, for Tatum, by not taxing the
maximum allowable amount, gets more for less. This raises, on a
smaller scale than in California, the exact situation struck down by
Serrano.
Diagram I shows that in fact a uniform tax rate may be more
objectionable than a graduated one. In California, wealthier districts
often tax fewer mills than the poorer districts and get more for less.
But with a uniform tax rate, the wealthier districts tax at as high a
rate as the poorer ones. Consequently they collect more money than
they would with a graduated rate and therefore have more money to
spend. The result of this kind of system is that although there are not
a number of districts getting more money from a lower tax rate,
there is a greater discrepancy in the wealth per district from property
taxes for the rich districts are collecting more money from local
sources than they would with a graduated rate. In-other words, the
poor districts cannot raise as much money as the rich with the same
tax rate, and the wealthier districts are able to take advantage of
local wealth to the benefit of their children.
The effect of the New Mexico system of school financing is reflected in Tables I and II. These tables compare state and local
62. A Comparison of State Basic Program and Equalization Distribution for 1970-71
Among School Districts as of 6/16/70, at 5 (Table prepared by the Public School Finance
Division of the Department of Finance and Administration).
63. Supra note 51.
64. Urban Coalition Brief, supra note 18, at 18.
65. Supra note 51.
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DIAGRAM 'I
ASSESSEO

VALUATION PER PUPIL

Funds generated with a constant tax rate.
Funds generated with a graduated tax rate. For the purpose of this diagram, assume a
basic level of support of $300 per 180-day ADM.
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TABLE I
NEW MEXICO-TEN SELECTED POORER COUNTIES

District (County)

Total Local
1970-71 and County
Local and
ADM
Funds to County Money
Basic State
180 Days* District**
Per Pupil**
Support 1970-71*

Mora (Mora)
1,133
$ 36,056
$ 32
$ 495,223
Pecos (San Miguel)
838
22,551
27
364,635
Las Vegas Town (San Miguel)
2,911
101,567
35
1,214,806
Espanola (Rio Arriba)
6,009
206,502
34
2,521,542
Las Cruces (Dona Ana)
15,787
794,764
50
6,449,686
Chama (Rio Arriba)
1,016
47,328
47
466,385
Las Vegas City (San Miguel)
2,864
118,871
42
1,195,670
Penasco (Taos)
868
58,771
68
389,874
Socorro (Socorro)
2,170
110,233
51
927,404
Clovis (Curry)
9,343
609,693
65
3,883,890
*
Figure supplied by the Division of Public School Finance, Department of Finance and
Administration.
** Computed from figures supplied by the Division of Public School Finance. Includes the
1970-71 district school tax levy and the general county school tax.

TABLE II
NEW MEXICO-TEN SELECTED WEALTHIER COUNTIES
District (County)

1970-71
Total Local
ADM
and County
180 Days* Funds to District**

Local and
County Money
Per Pupil**

Basic State
Support 1970-71

*

Tatum (Lea)
465
$293,802
$632
$ 222,918
Eunice (Lea)
898
343,097
382
401,582
Jal (Lea)
931
322,833
347
415,812
Corona (Lincoln)
174
53,353
307
133,662
Quemado (Catron)
180
42,198
234
135,216
Dora (Roosevelt)
233
74,470
320
146,667
Lovington (Lea)
3,171
879,646
277
1,364,457
Elida (Roosevelt)
142
26,222
185
117,251
House (Quay)
104
16,031
154
102,506
Animas (Hidalgo)
251
40,579
162
152,208
*
Figure supplied by the Division of Public School Finance, Department of Finance and
Administration.
** Computed from figures supplied by the Division of Public School Finance. Includes the
1970-71 district school tax levy and the general county school tax.

revenues available to ten of New Mexico's wealthiest counties and
ten selected poor counties. They show that Mora is annually able to
raise $32 per pupil with district ad valorem taxes, where Tatum raises
$632 per pupil annually with a lower tax rate. When funds from all
sources are taken into consideration, Tatum spends $1,040 per child
and Mora $578 each school year.6 6 Those who argue for the present
66. Per Capita Operational Expenditures by School Size 1970-1971, at 1, 2 (Table prepared by the Public School Finance Division of the Department of Finance and Administration).
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system point out that 97 percent of the funds spent in Mora are from
state sources, 6 7 but this does not justify the discrepancy that exists
nor meet the test of Serrano. It further can be seen that Mora, with
an average daily membership of 1,133 gets $495,223 in basic support
while Tatum, with an average daily membership of 465, gets
$222,918. In other words, Mora receives $437 per student in basic
aid and Tatum receives $479. It should be remembered that Tatum is
taxing 3.450 mills and Mora 4.450 mills.
Table II shows the annual total per pupil expenditure from all
sources for the ten highest and lowest New Mexico school districts.
Gadsden spends $520 per student annually where Causey spends
$1,282. If this figure is multiplied by a 30-student classroom, the
classroom in Gadsden has $15,600 to spend annually where Causey
has $38,460. The annual difference is $22,860 per room.
TABLE III
TEN POOREST SCHOOL DISTRICTS BY PER PUPIL EXPENDITURE 1970-197
SCHOOL DISTRICT

ANNUAL PER PUPIL EXPENDITURE*

Gadsden (Dona Ana)
Las Vegas Town (San Miguel)
Clovis (Curry)
Espanola (Rio Arriba)

ADM (180 DAYS)

$ 520
527
533
533

4,351
2,911
9,343
6,009

Deming (Luna)

536

3,688

Hatch (Dona Ana)
Las Vegas City (San Miguel)
Santa Fe (Santa Fe)
Albuquerque (Bernalillo)
Portales (Roosevelt)

543
543
549
552
553

924
2,864
11,781
83,260
2,927

TEN WEALTHIEST DISTRICTS BY PER PUPIL EXPENDITURE 1970-1971
Causey (Roosevelt)
House (Quay)
Quemado (Catron)
Grady (Curry)
Corona (Lincoln)
Tatum (Lea)
Maxwell (Colfax)
Elida (Roosevelt)

$1,282
1,186
1,066
1,047
1,043
1,040
1,023
1,008

94
104
180
161
174
465
146
142

990

152

Encino (Torrance)

Mosquero (Harding)
965
141
* Total per pupil expenditure-all sources 1970-71. Figures supplied by the Division of
Public School Finance of the Department of Finance and Administration.

It was argued before the California Supreme Court that the flat
grant or basic support was aid to the rich and was only "ghost
money" for the poorer districts. 6" Diagram II shows that this
67. Supra note 51.
68. Urban Coalition Brief, supra note 18, at 7.
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argument applies equally to New Mexico. The money given to poorer
districts as part of the basic support is of no real significance to them
because they would have received the same total if all they received
were equalization funds. Yet to the wealthier districts (those who
raise more than the equalization amount from local and county
sources) all money they get as basic support is money they would
not otherwise receive. Stephen Sugarman has pointed out that the
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problem with foundation plans is that traditionally they are inadequate and all above the basic level of expenditure is not
frills, but
6
essentials that make certain schools elite and others not. 9
Both New Mexico and California have constitutional provisions
which provide for free public schools. The New Mexico provision
reads:
A uniform system of free public schools sufficient for the education
of, and open to, all the children of school age in the state shall be
established and maintained. 7 0
The term "uniform" in this section probably would not be interpreted as requiring relatively equal or uniform funding but would
mean a single system with a uniform course of study. 7 1 It is doubtful, therefore, that there are sufficient state grounds in either state to
support the Serrano principle.
New Mexico has a school funding system that in many instances
makes the quality of a child's education a function of the wealth of
the community in which he resides. Developing a school funding
formula is a complicated task and New Mexico's present formula is a
complex effort to reconcile the many economic and political considerations that come to bear on this problem. But, as was stated by
Chief Justice Warren in delivering the opinion of the court in
Reynolds v. Sims: "One must be ever aware that the Constitution
forbids 'sophisticated as well as simple-minded modes of discrimination.' "7 2
SERRANO: ITS IMPACT ON NEW MEXICO
If New Mexico is to meet the test of Serrano, a revamping of our
present system of financing public education will be required. Certain local school districts will no longer be able to benefit from
property tax revenues as they have in the past, for the wealthier
districts are going to be required to help the poorer ones.
One of the real strengths of Serrano, as noted earlier, is that it is a
negative principle. Sugarman notes it is a decision "... requiring no
specific legislative action, [therefore] it would not present the problems of enforcement inherent in a prescriptive standard.... - This
is a broad principle which leaves the ultimate determination of a
financing formula in the hands of the state.
.

69.
70.
71.
72.
1257,
73.

Supra note 4.
N.M. Const. art. 12, § 1.
See 5 Cal.3d at 596, 487 P.2d at 1249, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 609 (1971).
Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 562 (1964) cited in 5 Cal.3d at 607, 487 P.2d at
96 Cal. Rptr. at 617, n. 24.
Urban Coalition Brief, supra note 18, at 36.
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M. Carl Holman, president of the National Urban Coalition, said
the following about the financing plans that will evolve in response
to Serrano:
We anticipate, then, that the experimentation will flow from the
California decision, with a variety of remedies rather than the
immediate selection of a single formula to replace the present state
funding systems in education.' 4
Six courses of action that can be used separately or in combination with each other to meet the Serrano test are:
1. "power equalization",
2. increased state funding to poorer districts,
3. redrawing school boundaries,
4. voucher system,
5. total state support, and
6. state collection of property taxes.
1. "Power equalization" is an approach developed by Sugarman
and Coons which would make educational offerings only a function
of the effort of the school district. 75 Coons explained this principle
as follows:
Under this plan, districts would decide how much they wanted to
spend on schools. They then would have to levy a tax equal to a
certain percentage of the assessed valuation.
The income from the percentage levied by different districts
would vary according to assessed valuation. The state would then
make up the difference.
Income, in effect, would be tied to a formula. The percentage that
a district would have to levy would increase as the total fund it
desired to spend on schools increased.' 6
The formula involved in power equalization might require removing industrial and commercial property from the local tax base and
having it taxed by the state. This would remove a source of extreme
district wealth."' Other changes would have to be made depending
on the particular characteristics of the district involved.
2. Increased state funding to poorer districts would eliminate the
disparities between districts. This would require enormous amounts
of money in New Mexico and is not a practical alternative if used
alone to remedy the present disparities.
3. School boundaries could be redrawn in an effort to create dis74.
75.
76.
77.

Supra note 8, at 4.
Urban Coalition Brief, supra note 18, at 39.
Los Angeles Times, Aug. 31, 1971, at 8, col. 4.
Urban Coalition Brief, supra note 18, at 40-41.
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tricts of more equal assessed valuation. In practice, this approach
would have limited use in New Mexico.
4. A voucher system could be adopted whereby each parent received a voucher worth a certain amount to pay for his child's education. The voucher could be delivered to any school to pay for
educational services. Private schools could accept the vouchers, but
only if the vouchers were the school's only source of revenue. If not,
disparities based on wealth of another kind would appear. The
amount of the voucher would vary depending on the needs of the
individual children.
5. The state could assume total responsibility for the support of
public schools. To meet the new burden this approach would place
on the state's financial resources, there would have to be either new
sources of revenue (taxes) or a redistribution of government functions between the state, local and county governmental units. Since
local government would have new financial resources from the
property taxes they were not spending on the schools, they could be
expected to provide or subsidize certain services now provided exclusively by the state.
Sugarman noted ". . . Any centralized system in which the state
collects everything and local districts are not permitted to tax at
7
all ..is O.K. under Serano. -1
Dr. R. L. Johns, Director of the National Educational Finance
Project, commented on the effect of state assumption of the entire
costs of public education:
There would be more equity for each child and for each taxpayer if
the school funds were allocated to local districts from a central
source.... Allocations from the central source wouldn't just be on a
flat per pupil basis. There would have to be more money per child
for each one who is physically handicapped or culturally disadvantaged because it is more expensive to educate such children. 7 9
6. The state could collect all property taxes and return them to
the school districts on the basis of local educational needs. This
would be perhaps the most practical approach for New Mexico since
it would not require great amounts of additional revenue and would
meet the test of Serrano.
Regardless of which approach would be best for New Mexico,
political considerations stand in the way of change. Wealthy districts
not only have more money for schools in many instances, but they
also wield great political influence. Legislators from these districts
78. Supra note 4.
79. New York Times, Sep. 5, 1971, § E, at 7, col 3.
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can be expected to resist any change that will either increase taxes
for education or decrease the funding their schools receive. Steve
Browning of the Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under Law
characterized the situation of children in poorer school districts as
"... . quite similar to that which existed in malapportioned state legis-

latures throughout the nation before the courts intervened in the
early sixties .. ."'I It appears, therefore, that no change can be
expected until the court acts. This should not be seen, however, as an
excuse for not immediately exploring alternatives to our present
system of financing education.
One final point must be noted briefly. Systems that finance capital
expenditures with local bonds will also be impermissible under the
Serrano decision since they make community wealth a criteria used
in determining the quality of the local school physical plant. Thus,
state legislatures will also be faced with the problem of devising a
new method of discharging local bond indebtedness where revenues
from local property taxes are presently being used.'
CONCLUSION
It is apparent that reliance on the property tax to finance educational needs in New Mexico results in more money in some school
districts than in others. Whether or not Serrano ultimately controls,
New Mexico should recognize these inequities and act to eliminate
them.
WILLIAM FRAZER CARR

80. Supra note 8, at 3.
81. Supra note 4.

